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All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
these days?
Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you 
say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?
Much of the time during the past week, you felt you were happy. Would you 
say yes or no?1
1The first of these three questions is from the World Values Survey; similar questions appear in the Euro-
Barometer Survey, the European Social Survey, the German Socioeconomic Panel, and the Japanese Life in Nation 
survey. The second question is from the US General Social Survey; similar questions appear in the Euro-Barometer
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Economists increasingly use survey-based measures of subjective well-being 
(SWB) as an empirical proxy for utility. In many applications, SWB data are used 
for testing or estimating preference models, or for conducting welfare evaluations, 
in situations where these are difficult to do credibly with choice-based revealed-
preference methods. Examples include estimating the negative externality from 
neighbors’ higher earnings (Luttmer 2005), individuals’ trade-off between infla-
tion and unemployment (Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003), and the effect 
of health status on the marginal utility of consumption (Finkelstein, Luttmer, and 
Notowidigdo forthcoming). Such work often points out that in addition to being 
readily available where choice-based methods might not be, SWB-based proxies 
avoid the concern that choices may reflect systematically biased beliefs about their 
consequences (e.g., Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003; Gilbert 2006).
It hence interprets SWB data as revealing what people would choose if they were 
well informed about the consequences of their choices for SWB, and uses SWB 
measures to proxy for utility under the assumption that people make the choices 
they think would maximize their SWB. This paper provides evidence for evaluat-
ing that assumption.
We pose a variety of hypothetical decision scenarios to three respondent popula-
tions: a convenience sample of 1,066 adults, a representative sample of 1,000 adult 
Americans, and 633 students. Each scenario has two alternatives. For example, one 
scenario describes a choice between a job that pays less but allows more sleep ver-
sus a job with higher pay and less sleep. We ask respondents which alternative they 
think they would choose. We also ask them under which alternative they anticipate 
greater SWB; we assess this “predicted SWB” using measures based on each of the 
three commonly used SWB questions posed in the epigraph above. We test whether 
these two rankings coincide.2 To the extent that they do not, we attempt to iden-
tify—by eliciting predictions about other consequences of the choice alternatives—
what else besides predicted SWB explains respondents’ hypothetical choices, and to 
quantify the relative contribution of predicted SWB and other factors in explaining 
these choices.
In designing our surveys, we made two methodological decisions that merit dis-
cussion. First, while the purpose of our paper is to help relate choice behavior to 
SWB measures, those measures are based on reports of respondents’ general lev-
els of realized SWB, whereas our survey questions elicit respondents’ predictions 
comparing the SWB consequences of specific choices. To compare SWB rankings 
with choice rankings under the same information set and beliefs, however, we must 
measure predictions about SWB, because it is only predictions that are available at 
the moment of choice. Moreover, to link SWB with choice, we must focus on the 
SWB consequences of specific choices.
survey, the National Survey of Families and Households, and the World Values Survey. The third question is from 
the University of Michigan’s Surveys of Consumers; similar questions appear in the Center of Epidemiologic 
Studies Depression Scale, the Health and Retirement Study, and the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index.
2 In the terminology of Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997), our work can be viewed as comparing “deci-
sion utility” (what people choose) with “predicted utility” (what people predict will make them happier). We 
avoid these terms, however, because our “decisions” are hypothetical; and because we ask respondents to 
predict their responses to common SWB survey questions, rather than the integral over time of their moment-
by-moment affect.
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Second, while economists generally prefer data on incentivized choices, our 
choice data consist of responses to questions about predicted choice in hypothetical 
scenarios. This is a limitation of our approach, because the two may not be the same.3
However, using hypothetical scenarios allows us to address a much wider variety of 
relevant real-world choice situations. It also allows us to have closely comparable 
survey measures of choice and SWB.4 For brevity, hereafter we will sometimes omit 
the modifiers “predicted” and “hypothetical” when the context makes it clear that by 
“choice” and “SWB” we refer to our survey questions.
We have two main results. First, we find that overall, respondents’ SWB predic-
tions are a powerful predictor of their choices. On average, SWB and choice coin-
cide 83 percent of the time in our data. We find that the strength of this relationship 
varies across choice situations, subject populations, survey methods, questionnaire 
structure variations, and measures of SWB, with coincidence ranging from well 
below 50 percent to above 95 percent.
Our second main result is that discrepancies between choice and SWB rankings 
are systematic. Moreover, we can identify other factors that help explain respon-
dents’ choices. As mentioned above, in addition to eliciting participants’ choices and 
predicted SWB, in some surveys we also elicit their predictions regarding particular 
aspects of life other than their own SWB. The aspects that systematically contribute 
most to explaining choice, controlling for own SWB, are sense of purpose, control 
over life, family happiness, and social status. At the same time, and in line with our 
first main result above, when we compare the predictive power of own SWB to that 
of the other factors we measure, we find that across our scenarios, populations, and 
methods, it is by far the single best predictor of choice.
We use a variety of survey versions and empirical approaches in order to test the 
robustness of our main results to alternative interpretations. For example, while most 
of our data are gathered by eliciting both choice and predicted SWB rankings from 
each respondent, in some of our survey variations we elicit the two rankings far apart 
in the survey, or we elicit only choice rankings from some participants and only SWB 
rankings from others. As another example, we assess the impact of measurement 
error by administering the same survey twice (weeks or months apart) to some of our 
respondents. While these different approaches affect our point estimates and, hence, 
the relative importance of our two main results, both results appear to be robust.
As steps toward providing practical, measure-specific and situation-specific 
guidance to empirical researchers as to when the assumption that people’s choices 
maximize their predicted SWB is a better or worse approximation, we analyze 
how our results differ across SWB measures and across scenarios. Comparing 
SWB measures, we find that in our data, a “life satisfaction” measure (modeled 
after the first question in the epigraph) is a better predictor of choice than either 
of two “happiness” measures (modeled after the second and third questions in 
3Although economists generally prefer data on incentivized choices, in some situations self-reports may be more 
informative about preferences, e.g., when temptation, social pressure, or family bargaining might distort real-world 
choices away from preferences. (As we mention below, our data are silent on which method best elicits preferences.)
4The advantage in having closely comparable (survey-based) measures is that when we find discrepancies 
between choice responses and SWB responses, these discrepancies can be attributed wholly to differences in ques-
tion content rather than at least partially to differences in how respondents react to the perceived realness of the 
consequences of their response.
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the epigraph) that perform similarly to each other. Comparing scenarios, we find 
that in scenarios constructed to resemble what our student respondents judge as 
representative of important decisions in their lives, predicted SWB coincides least
often with choice, and other factors add relatively more explanatory power. We 
also find that in scenarios where one alternative offers more money, respondents 
are systematically more likely to choose the money alternative than they are likely 
to predict it will yield higher SWB. Under some conditions, this last finding sug-
gests that the increasingly common method of valuing nonmarket goods by com-
paring the coefficients from a regression of SWB on income and on the amount 
of a good5 systematically estimates a higher value than incentivized choice–based 
methods of eliciting willingness-to-pay (since the weight of money in predicted 
SWB understates its weight in choice).
Much previous research has studied the relationship between choice and hap-
piness.6 Our work is most closely related to experiments reported in Tversky and 
Griffin (2000); Hsee (1999); and Hsee et al. (2003) that use methods similar to 
some of ours.7 However, because our goal is to provide guidance for interpreting 
results from the empirical economics literature, our paper differs from these prior 
papers in two fundamental ways. First, both our scenarios and our SWB measures 
are tailored to be closely relevant to the economics literature. Thus, rather than 
primarily focusing on narrow affective reactions to specific consumption experi-
ences (e.g., the “enjoyment” of a sound system), as in Hsee (1999) and Hsee et 
al. (2003), we purposefully model our measures on the SWB questions asked in 
large-scale social surveys, and we focus on a range of scenarios that we designed 
to be relevant to empirical work in economics as well as scenarios that are judged 
by our respondents to represent important decisions in their lives. Second, cru-
cially, we elicit predictions about other valued aspects of the choice alternatives. 
Indeed, it has often been observed that factors beyond one’s own happiness (in 
the narrow sense measured by standard survey measures) may matter for choice.8
As far as we are aware, however, our work is the first to quantitatively estimate 
the relative contribution of predicted SWB and these other factors in explaining 
choice.
5Recent examples have valued deaths in one’s family (Deaton, Fortson, and Tortora 2010), the social costs of 
terrorism (Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer 2009), and the social cost of floods (Luechinger and Raschky 2009).
6In a spirit similar to ours, Becker and Rayo (2008) propose (but do not pursue) empirical tests of whether things 
other than happiness matter for preferences in empirically relevant choice situations. Relatedly, Perez-Truglia 
(2010) tests empirically whether the utility function inferred from consumption choices is distinguishable from the 
estimated happiness function over consumption. In contrast to our approach, these tests and their interpretation are 
affected by whether individuals correctly predict the SWB consequences of their choices.
Our work is also related to a literature in philosophy that poses thought experiments in hypothetical scenarios in 
order to demonstrate that people’s preferences encompass more than their own happiness (e.g., Nozick 1974), but 
that literature focuses on extreme situations, such as being hooked up to a machine that guarantees happiness, and 
focuses on an abstract conception of happiness that is broader than empirical measures.
7These papers find discrepancies between choice and predicted affective reactions, in hypothetical scenarios 
carefully designed to test theories about why the two may differ. Tversky and Griffin (2000) theorize that payoff 
levels are weighted more heavily in choice, while contrasts between payoffs and a reference point are weighted 
more heavily in happiness judgments. Hsee (1999) and Hsee et al. (2003) theorize that when making choices, 
individuals engage in “lay rationalism,” i.e., they mistakenly put too little weight on anticipated affect and too much 
weight on “rationalistic” factors that include payoff levels as well as quantitatively measured attributes. Our find-
ing that factors other than SWB help predict choice provides a different possible perspective on the evidence from 
these earlier papers.
8For a few recent examples, see Diener and Scollon (2003); Loewenstein and Ubel (2008); Hsee, Hastie, and 
Chen (2008); and Fleurbaey (2009).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the survey 
design and subject populations. Section II asks whether participants choose the 
alternative in our decision scenarios that they predict will generate greater SWB. 
Section III asks whether aspects of life other than SWB help predict choice, con-
trolling for SWB, and compares the relative predictive power of the factors that 
matter for choice. Section IV presents robustness analyses. Section V characterizes 
the heterogeneity in choice-SWB concordance across SWB measures, scenarios, 
and respondent characteristics. Section VI concludes and discusses other possible 
applications of our methodology and implications of our findings. For example, 
while our paper focuses on testing measures that are based on existing SWB survey 
questions, our methodology can be used to explore whether alternative, novel ques-
tions could better explain choice. And while our data cannot inform us regarding 
the best way to elicit preferences, if one assumes that hypothetical choices reveal 
preferences, then our findings may imply that individuals do not exclusively seek to 
maximize SWB as currently measured. The online Appendix (available at the jour-
nal website) lists our decision scenarios. For longer discussions, as well as detailed 
information on all survey instruments, pilots, robustness analyses, and additional 
results, see our working paper, Benjamin et al. (2010) with its online Appendix 
(hereafter BHKR).
I. Survey Design
While our main evidence is based on 29 different survey versions, they all share 
a similar core that consists of a sequence of hypothetical pairwise-choice scenar-
ios. To illustrate, our ‘Scenario 1’ highlights a trade-off between sleep and income. 
Followed by its SWB and choice questions, it appears on one of our questionnaires 
as follows:
Say you have to decide between two new jobs. The jobs are exactly the 
same in almost every way but have different work hours and pay different 
amounts.
Option 1: A job paying $80,000 per year. The hours for this job are rea-
sonable, and you would be able to get about 7.5 hours of sleep on the 
average work night.
Option 2: A job paying $140,000 per year. However, this job requires 
you to go to work at unusual hours, and you would only be able to sleep 
around 6 hours on the average work night.
Between these two options, taking all things together, which do you think 
would give you a happier life as a whole?
Option 1: Option 2:
Sleep more but earn less Sleep less but earn more
Definitely
happier
Probably 
happier
Possibly 
happier
Possibly 
happier
Probably 
happier
Definitely
happier
X X X X X X
Please circle one X in the line above
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If you were limited to these two options, which do you think you would choose?
In within-subject questionnaires, respondents are asked both the SWB question 
and the choice question above. In between-subjects questionnaires, respondents are 
asked only one of the two questions.
A. Populations and Studies
We conducted surveys among 2,699 respondents from three populations: 1,066 
patients at a doctor’s waiting room in Denver who participated voluntarily; 1,000 
adults who participated by telephone in the 2009 Cornell National Social Survey 
(CNSS) and form a nationally representative sample;9 and 633 Cornell students who 
were recruited on campus and participated for pay or for course credit. The Denver 
and Cornell studies include both within-subject and between-subjects survey vari-
ants, while the CNSS study is exclusively within subject.
Table 1 summarizes the design details of these studies. It lists each study’s 
respondent population, sample size, scenarios used (see Section IB below), types 
of questions asked (see Section IC below), and other details such as response 
scales, scenario order, and question order.10 The rest of this section explains the 
details summarized in the table.
B. Scenarios
Our full set of 13 scenarios is given in the online Appendix. Table 1 reports which 
scenarios are used in which studies, and in what order they appear on different ques-
tionnaires. As detailed in the online Appendix, some scenarios are asked in different 
versions (e.g., different wording, different quantities of money, etc.) and some sce-
narios are tailored to different respondent populations (e.g., while we ask students 
about school, we ask older respondents about work). In constructing the scenarios, 
we were guided by four considerations.
First, we chose scenarios that highlight trade-offs between options that the litera-
ture suggests might be important determinants of SWB. Hence, respondents face 
choices between jobs and housing options that are more attractive financially versus 
ones that allow for: in Scenario 1, more sleep (Kahneman et al. 2004; Kelly 2004);
in Scenario 12, a shorter commute (Stutzer and Frey 2008); in 13, being around 
9The CNSS is an annual survey conducted by Cornell University’s Survey Research Institute. For details: https://
sri.cornell.edu/SRI/cnss.cfm.
10The median age in our Denver, CNSS, and Cornell samples is, respectively, 47, 49, and 21; the share of female 
respondents is 76, 53, and 60 percent. For summary statistics, see BHKR Table A3.
Option 1: Option 2:
Sleep more but earn less Sleep less but earn more
Definitely
choose
Probably 
choose
Possibly 
choose
Possibly 
choose
Probably 
choose
Definitely
choose
X X X X X X
Please circle one X in the line above
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friends (Kahneman et al. 2004); and in 3, making more money relative to others 
(Luttmer 2005; see Heffetz and Frank 2011, for a survey).
Second, since some of us were initially unsure we would find any divergences 
between predicted choice and SWB, in our earlier surveys we focused on choice 
situations where one’s SWB may not be the only consideration. Hence, in Scenario 
4 respondents choose between a career path that promises an “easier” life with fewer 
sacrifices versus one that promises posthumous impact and fame, and in Scenarios 2 
Table 1—Study-Specific Information
Denver CNSS Cornell
Choice versus SWB: Within- 
or between-subjects design Within Between Within Within  Between
Sample population Volunteers at a 
doctor’s waiting room
Nationally
representative Cornell students
Observations 497 569 1,000 432a 201
Scenarios used 1, 3, 4, 
11, 12, 13
1, 2, 3, 4 (v2),
12 (v2), 13 1
1–10 (with v2 
for scenario 4)
Observations for each SWB question format:
(i) Life satisfaction
(isolated) 164 569
(ii) Happiness with life as a whole
(isolated) 162 1,000
(iii) Felt happiness
(isolated) 171
(iv) Own happiness with life as a
whole
isolated 107 201
First/last in series 107
(v) Immediately felt own happiness
isolated 110
First/last in series 108
SWB response scale 6-point Binary 7-point
Choice response scale 6-point Binary 6-point
Metachoice question Yes No No Yes No
Order variations:
Scenario order 4-1-11-12-13-3 1-2-12-13-3-4 1 1-2- … -9-10
3-13-12-11-1-4 3-13-12-2-1-4b
Question order Choice-meta-SWB SWB-choice Choice-SWB
SWB-choice-meta
Aspects of life order Two opposite orderings 
of aspects
Summary: number of 
questionnaire versions
12 4 1 8 4
Notes: See Section I for the framing of the choice, SWB, and meta-choice questions. See the online Appendix for 
a full description of each scenario. The scenarios corresponding to the scenario-numbers above are: (1) sleep ver-
sus income, (2) concert versus birthday, (3) absolute income versus relative income, (4) legacy versus income, (5)
apple versus orange, (6) money versus time, (7) socialize versus sleep, (8) family versus money, (9) education ver-
sus social life, (10) interest versus career, (11) concert versus duty, (12) low rent versus short commute, (13) friends 
versus income.
a Of these, 230 were surveyed twice, allowing us to conduct measurement error–corrected estimation.
b Scenario 4 is always presented last because it is followed by both a choice and a SWB question. In order to have 
a clean between-subjects design, we did not want subjects to know we were interested in both choice and SWB until 
after subjects were done with the rest of the scenarios. We also note that this scenario is presented in four differ-
ent order-versions, so strictly speaking, the Denver between-subjects study includes the four questionnaire versions 
reported in the table’s bottom row, times four (16 versions in total).
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and 11 they choose between a more convenient or “fun” option versus an option that 
might be considered “the right thing to do.”
Third, once we found divergences between predicted SWB and choice, in our later 
surveys (the Cornell studies) we wanted to assess the magnitude of these divergences 
in scenarios that are representative of important decisions faced by our respondent 
population. For this purpose we asked a sample of students to list the three top deci-
sions they made in the last day, month, two years, and in their whole lives.11 Naturally, 
decisions that were frequently mentioned by respondents revolved around studying, 
working, socializing and sleeping. Hence, in the resulting Scenarios 7–10, individuals 
have to choose between socializing and fun versus sleep and schoolwork; traveling 
home for Thanksgiving versus saving the airfare money; attending a more fun and 
social college versus a highly selective one; and following one’s passion versus pur-
suing a more practical career path. To these scenarios we added Scenario 6, which 
involves a time-versus-money trade-off tailored for a student population.
Fourth, as an informal check on our methods, we wanted to have one falsification-
test scenario where we expected a respondent’s choice and SWB ratings to coin-
cide. For this purpose, we added Scenario 5, in which respondents face a choice 
between two food items (apple versus orange) that are offered free and for immedi-
ate consumption. Since we carefully attempted to avoid any non-SWB differences 
between the options, we hypothesized that in this scenario, predicted SWB would 
most strongly predict choice. This scenario has the additional attraction of being 
similar to prevalent decisions in almost everyone’s life, which is our third consider-
ation above.
C. Main Questions
Choice Question.—In all studies, for each scenario, the choice question is worded 
as in our example above. In our analysis, we convert the horizontal six-point 
response scale into an intensity-of-choice variable, ranging from 1 to 6, or into a 
binary choice variable. CNSS responses are elicited as binary choices.12
SWB Question.—While the choice question is always kept the same, we vary 
the SWB question in order to examine how choice relates to several different SWB 
measures. In our Denver within-subject study we ask three versions of the SWB 
question, modeled after what we view as three “families” of SWB questions that are 
commonly used in the literature (see examples in the epigraph):
(i) Life satisfaction: “Between these two options, which do you think would 
make you more satisfied with life, all things considered?”;
(ii) Happiness with life as a whole: “Between these two options, taking all things 
together, which do you think would give you a happier life as a whole?”; and
11The sample included 102 University of Chicago students; results were subsequently supported by surveying 
another 171 Cornell students. See BHKR for details and classification of responses.
12CNSS responses are elicited as binary because in telephone interviews the binary format is both briefer for 
interviewers to convey and easier for respondents to understand.
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(iii) Felt happiness: “Between these two options, during a typical week, which do 
you think would make you feel happier?”
As in the example above, there are six possible answers, which we convert into 
either a six-point variable or a binary variable.
In the CNSS study, where design constraints limited us to one version of the SWB 
question, we ask only version (ii). As with the choice question, response is binary.
As described shortly, in our Cornell studies we ask respondents about 12 different 
aspects of life, of which (one’s own) happiness is only one. In those studies we use 
versions of (ii) and (iii) that are modified to remain meaningful, with fixed wording, 
across aspects. The modified (ii) and (iii) result in these two new versions:
(iv) Own happiness with life as a whole: “Between these two options, taking all 
things together, which option do you think would make your life as a whole 
better in terms of … [your own happiness]”; and
(v) Immediately-felt own happiness: “Between these two options, in the few 
minutes immediately after making the choice, which option do you think 
would make you feel better in terms of … [your own happiness].”13
The modified response scale now includes a middle “no difference” response, and has 
seven possible answers (Option 1 definitely better; Option 1 probably better; Option 1
possibly better; no difference; Option 2 possibly better, etc.). We allow respondents to 
indicate “no difference” because we anticipated that in some of the scenarios, it would 
make little sense to force respondents to predict that all aspects would differ across the 
two options (e.g., “sense of purpose” in Scenario 5, “apple versus orange”).
On the spectrum from more cognitive, evaluative SWB measures to more affective, 
hedonic ones (e.g., Diener et al. 2009), we view version (i) as the most evaluative, 
versions (iii) and (v) as the most affective, and versions (ii) and (iv) as intermediate.
Other Questions.—For completeness, we briefly mention, first, that in all ques-
tionnaires of the Denver and Cornell within-subject studies, the choice question is 
followed by what we refer to as a meta-choice question: “If you were limited to 
these two options, which would you want yourself to choose?” Also, recall that the 
SWB question in all Cornell studies is modified to elicit rankings of the two scenario 
options in terms of 11 additional aspects of life as well as “own happiness.” For 
example, in versions (iv) and (v) of the SWB question, [your own happiness] may be 
followed by [your family’s happiness], [your health], [your romantic life], etc.14 We 
discuss these additional questions and the data they yield in later sections.
13Since our between-subject tests have less statistical power than our within-subject tests, we ask only version 
(i) in our Denver between-subjects surveys and only version (iv) in our Cornell between-subjects surveys.
14In some questionnaire versions, we separate “own happiness” from the other 11 aspects and ask respondents first 
only about own happiness in each scenario, and then, re-presenting the scenarios, we ask about the other aspects. In 
these versions, we refer to the question on own happiness as an “isolated” measure of SWB (see Table 1). In other ver-
sions, where the 12 aspects appear together, we refer to the own happiness question as a “first/last in series” measure. 
When own happiness is “first in series,” the 12 aspects appear together in the order they are listed as regressors in 
Table 3 below. When own happiness is “last in series,” the 12 aspects appear together in reverse order.
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II. Do People Respond to the Choice and SWB Questions in the Same Way?
In this section we look at respondents’ binary ranking of Option 1 versus Option 2 
in terms of hypothetical choice compared with their binary ranking in terms of pre-
dicted SWB.
A. Within-Subject Results
Table 2 reports the distribution of binary responses to our within-subject surveys’ 
choice and SWB questions by study and scenario, along with p-value statistics from 
equality-of-proportions tests. The table pools responses across SWB question vari-
ants (see Section IC and Table 1 above); we discuss results by specific SWB mea-
sure below.15
The left-most column in the top section of the table reports Scenario 1 figures from 
the Denver within-subject questionnaires (our “sleep versus income” scenario from 
the example in Section I). The column’s top four cells report a vertically stacked 
2 × 2 contingency matrix, consisting of the joint binary distribution of subjects who 
favor an option in the choice question and those who favor it in the SWB question. 
Looking at these four cells, we point out two facts that illustrate this section’s two 
main findings. First, the top two cells reveal that the SWB response is highly predic-
tive of the choice response: between the two cells, 87 percent of respondents rank 
Option 1 versus Option 2 in the choice question the same as they do in the SWB 
question. Second, the next two cells reveal systematic differences across the two 
questions among the remaining 13 percent of respondents: while 12 percent rank 
Option 1 (sleep) above Option 2 (income) in the SWB question and reverse this 
ranking in the choice question, only 1 percent do the opposite. This asymmetry 
suggests that on average, respondents react to the two questions systematically dif-
ferently. The fifth cell reports the p-value from a Liddell exact test, a nonparametric, 
equality-of-proportions test for paired data (Liddell 1983). The null hypothesis—
namely, that the proportion of respondents who rank Option 2 above Option 1 is the 
same across the choice and the SWB questions—is easily rejected.
Examining the top five rows in Table 2 for the rest of the Denver columns veri-
fies that the two main findings above are not unique to Scenario 1: in the remain-
ing five scenarios, 81 to 90 percent of respondents rank the two options identically 
across the choice and SWB questions; yet in four out of five cases, choice-SWB 
reversals among the remaining 10 to 19 percent of respondents are asymmetric, 
and the equality-of-proportions null hypothesis across the two questions is easily 
rejected. In these cases, respondents rank income above legacy, concert above duty, 
low rent above short commute, and income above friends in higher proportions in 
the choice question than in the SWB question. There appears to be a systematic 
15Nonresponse in our surveys was generally low. In the Cornell studies, virtually all questions had a nonre-
sponse rate below 2 percent (one Cornell respondent was excluded due to obvious confusion with instructions). In 
the CNSS, fewer than 5 percent of respondents answered “Do not know” or refused to answer in any of the ques-
tions. Due to the less-structured recruiting method used in our Denver doctor’s office studies, some questions from 
those studies had nonresponse rates as high as 20 percent. However, the majority of this nonresponse is driven by 
respondents being called in for their appointments, alleviating concerns of selection bias. Comparing the completed 
responses of subjects who did not finish the survey to the responses of those who finished the entire survey, we find 
no evidence of a difference in average responses.
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Cornell
Choice scenario 6 7 8 9 10
Money Socialize Family Education Interest
versus versus versus versus versus
time
%
sleep
%
money
%
social life
%
career
%
Higher SWB: Option 1 44 62 68 53 27
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 2 37 15 15 22 35
Chosen: Option 2
Higher SWB: Option 2 14 17 5 22 3
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 1 5 6 12 3 35
Chosen: Option 2
Indifference for SWB 22 10 5 6 6
p-value of Liddell Exact Test 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
n = 333 n = 385 n = 409 n = 402 n = 402
Notes: Response distribution by study and scenario. For the complete text of each scenario, see the online Appendix. 
If a scenario’s phrasing changed meaningfully between surveys, the version of the scenario is indicated in the first 
row of the study block. The Liddell Exact Test is a paired equality-of-proportions test of the null hypothesis that 
mean response to choice question = mean response to SWB question. In the Cornell data, where respondents could 
indicate SWB indifference, responses indicating indifference were dropped before conducting the test.
Table 2—Choice and SWB Responses across Studies and Scenarios (within-subject data)
Denver CNSS
Choice scenario 1 3 4 11 12 13 1
Abs. inc. Low rent
Sleep versus Legacy Concert versus Friends Sleep
versus 
income
%
relative 
income
%
versus 
income
%
versus 
duty
%
short
commute
%
versus 
income
%
versus 
income
%
Higher SWB: Option 1 58 48 24 16 52 50 74
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 2 29 42 60 65 32 34 18
Chosen: Option 2
Higher SWB: Option 2 1 6 2 12 11 2 1
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 1 12 4 14 7 5 14 7
Chosen: Option 2
p-value from Liddell Exact Test 0.000 0.350 0.000 0.024 0.002 0.000 0.000
n = 425 n = 420 n = 422 n = 422 n = 425 n = 422 n = 972
Cornell
Choice scenario 1 2 3 4 5
Sleep Concert Abs. inc. Legacy Apple
versus versus versus versus versus
income
%
birthday
%
rel. inc.
%
income
%
orange
%
  Version 2
Higher SWB: Option 1 29 29 41 44 45
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 2 46 49 43 31 50
Chosen: Option 2
Higher SWB: Option 2 1 7 14 8 2
Chosen: Option 1
Higher SWB: Option 1 23 15 2 17 3
Chosen: Option 2
Indifference for SWB 8 14 13 10 37
p-value of Liddell Exact Test 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.424
n = 397 n = 368 n = 375 n = 387 n = 270
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tendency among respondents to favor money in the choice question more than in 
the SWB question, a point we return to below. (The results for the absolute versus 
relative income scenario are discussed below.)
Similarly, the CNSS column suggests that, qualitatively, Scenario 1’s findings carry 
over from our Denver study—a pencil-and-paper survey with six-point response 
scales administered to a convenience sample—to the CNSS study—a telephone sur-
vey with binary response scales administered to a nationally representative sample. 
While the proportion of participants with no choice-SWB reversals increases to 92 
percent, almost all of the rest—7 out of the remaining 8 percent—favor Option 1 
(sleep) in the SWB question and Option 2 (income) in the choice question. The 
direction of this asymmetry is, hence, the same as in the Denver sample, and equal-
ity of proportions is again easily rejected.
Last among our within-subject data, results from the Cornell surveys are reported 
in the bottom section of Table 2. The structure of this portion of the table is similar to 
the corresponding Denver and CNSS portions, with the following three differences 
that result from the fact that the Cornell questionnaires allow for an additional “no 
difference” response in the SWB question: (a) an additional row below the top four 
rows reports the proportion of respondents who choose the “no difference” response; 
(b) the top four rows report vertically stacked contingency matrices as before, only 
here they exclude these “no difference” responses (their sum is normalized to 100 
percent); and (c) the “no difference” responses are excluded from the Liddell tests.16
Starting again with Scenario 1 in the left-most column, choice-SWB reversals (in
the third and fourth rows, 24 percent together) are still a minority, although they are 
almost twice to three times more common in the Cornell sample than in the Denver 
and CNSS samples. Nonetheless, consistent with the Denver and CNSS data, in 
virtually all of these reversals—23 of the 24 percent—Option 1 (sleep) is ranked 
above Option 2 (income) in the SWB question and below it in the choice question. 
Equality of proportions is, again, strongly rejected for this scenario.17
Moving to the rest of the Cornell columns reveals a similar story. Equality of pro-
portions is strongly rejected for all the remaining nine scenarios (2–10) as well, with 
the exception of Scenario 5. Recall that we constructed Scenario 5 (“apple versus 
orange”) as a falsification test, where—barring problems with our methods—choice 
and SWB should largely coincide. The results support this prediction. Indeed, only 
5 percent of responses exhibit reversals in this scenario, by far the lowest fraction 
among the ten scenarios. Furthermore, we find no evidence that these reversals are 
in one systematic direction.18 As to the two other scenarios that are used in both the 
16The distribution of choice-responses among individuals indicating “no difference” for SWB mirrors the dis-
tribution of choice-responses among the rest of the respondents reasonably closely (BHKR Table A5), and, hence, 
the choice proportions in Table 2 are virtually unaffected by excluding these individuals. Note that, under the null 
hypothesis that choice is determined solely by predicted SWB, the distribution of choice-responses should be closer 
to 50-50 for individuals indicating SWB “no difference.” Hence, the responses of these respondents actually provide 
additional suggestive evidence against the null hypothesis.
17Comparing each of the top four cells in the Scenario 1 column across the three within-subject samples reveals 
that the reported proportions differ dramatically between the samples. Given the very different populations and, in 
the CNSS study, the very different survey methods, this finding in itself is not surprising. (For example, we specu-
late that since a telephone survey is harder to understand, more respondents answered the two questions in the same 
way, taking the “artificial consistency” mental shortcut discussed in Section IIB below.)
18At the same time, a sizeable 37 percent of respondents indicate “no difference” in the SWB question in 
Scenario 5—by far the highest. This may suggest that Scenario 5 is “cleaner” than we intended it to be: not only 
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Denver and Cornell studies—Scenarios 3 and 4—choice-SWB reversals maintain 
their direction: in both studies, (absolute) income is ranked above relative income 
(Scenario 3) and above legacy (Scenario 4) in the choice questions more often than 
in the SWB questions. While equality of proportions is rejected in the Cornell data 
but not in the Denver data in Scenario 3, it is rejected in both studies in Scenario 4.
Finally, in Scenarios 6 and 8, which are used only in the Cornell studies and 
include a “money” option, we once again find that respondents favor money in the 
choice question more than in the SWB question. That this tendency holds in all 
seven scenarios that trade off more money/income for something else—be it more 
sleep, higher relative income, a legacy, a shorter commute, being around friends, 
having more time, or visiting family—suggests that predicted SWB understates the 
weight of money and income in hypothetical choice.19 Of course, predicted SWB is 
not the same as experienced SWB, and hypothetical choice is not the same as incen-
tivized choice. Nevertheless, unless the difference between those gaps is sufficiently 
negatively correlated with the systematic gap we find between hypothetical choice 
and predicted SWB, our results suggest that survey measures of experienced SWB 
do not fully capture the weight of money and income in choice.
Our two main findings—that the ranking of the two options is identical across 
the choice and SWB questions for most respondents and in most scenarios, but that 
respondents react to the two questions systematically differently—hold not only in the 
pooled data, but also for each SWB question variant (i)–(v) separately. We show this 
in BHKR Table A4, which reports versions of Table 2 by SWB measure. Interestingly, 
we find some differences across the measures in the prevalence of choice-SWB rever-
sals. In the Denver sample, the life satisfaction question variation (i) comes closest 
to matching choice, with only 11 percent reversals, averaged across all scenarios. In 
comparison, happiness with life as a whole (ii) and felt happiness (iii) yield more 
reversals—17 percent each. In the Cornell sample, own happiness with life as a whole 
(iv) and immediately felt own happiness (v) both yield 22 percent reversals. We return 
to the comparison between different SWB measures in Section VA below.
B. Between-Subjects Results
Our within-subject analysis above is based on both choice and SWB responses 
elicited from each individual. However, empirical work that uses SWB data relies 
on surveys that measure SWB alone, not together with choice. Thus, two poten-
tial biases could compromise the relevance of our findings to existing SWB survey 
data and their applications. On the one hand, asking a respondent both questions 
might generate an “artificial consistency” between the two responses. For example, 
respondents might think they ought to give consistent answers, or might give con-
sistent answers as an effort-saving mental shortcut. On the other hand, an “artificial 
inconsistency” bias is also possible if respondents infer from being asked more than 
non-SWB aspects of life, but even own happiness is deemed by many respondents irrelevant in what they may 
perceive as a context of de gustibus non est disputandum.
19Reassuringly, this tendency in our data is consistent both with the data of Tversky and Griffin (2000) and Hsee 
et al. (2003), who use a scenario similar to our Scenario 3 (absolute income versus relative income), and with their 
psychological theories (e.g., “lay rationalism”) mentioned in footnote 7.
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one question that they ought to give different answers, or if the presence of the other 
question focuses respondents’ attention on the contrast between the wordings.
To assess these concerns, we compare the above results from the Denver and 
Cornell within-subject studies with their counterpart between-subjects studies, in 
which respondents are asked only the choice or only the SWB question. Three of the 
six Denver scenarios analyzed above, and all ten of the Cornell scenarios, are repeated 
with identical wording in their between-subjects counterparts (see Table 1). Across 
these 13 comparable scenarios and including only the within-subject respondents 
who faced the SWB measure used in the between studies (i.e., variant (i) in Denver 
and (iv) in Cornell), the median within-versus-between absolute difference in the 
proportion of respondents favoring each option is 5 percentage points in the choice 
question (a statistically significant difference in two scenarios) and is 8 percentage 
points in the SWB question (statistically significant in four scenarios).20 Overall, 
then, the within and between response distributions sometimes differ. Moreover, the 
direction of the differences in the choice compared to the SWB data suggests that, 
on average, artificial inconsistency might indeed explain some of the choice-SWB 
reversals in the within data: in the within data, the average choice-SWB difference 
in proportions is 10.8 percentage points; in the between data, it is 7.4 percentage 
points—about two-thirds of the within difference.
While differences in proportions between choice and SWB are on average of 
smaller magnitudes in the between data, they remain sufficiently large to yield 
statistical results comparable to those in the within data. In the between data, we 
can reject the null hypothesis of no difference between choice and SWB propor-
tions in four scenarios, which is fewer than in the within data discussed in Section 
IIA. However, one important reason is that, mechanically, the unpaired test on the 
between data has much less statistical power than the paired test on the within data: 
even with an equal number of respondents, each responds to only one question 
instead of two, and we cannot partial out correlated individual effects on choice and 
SWB in analyzing the between data. To compare the within and between data con-
trolling for power differences, we “unpaired” our within data, matched sample sizes 
as closely as possible, and simulated unpaired equality-of-proportion tests that treat 
these data as if they were between data. We find that we can reject the no-difference 
null in four scenarios, exactly the same as what we find using the between data.
Our overall interpretation is that while there are differences across the between- 
and the within-subject studies—in particular, choice-SWB reversals are on average 
less pronounced in the between-subjects studies—either set of studies supports our 
two main findings.
20Using Fisher tests and a 5 percent significance level, we reject the null hypothesis that equal proportions 
choose Option 2 in the within and between data for the Denver sleep versus income scenario (1) and the Cornell 
interest versus career scenario (10). We reject the null hypothesis that equal proportions anticipate higher SWB 
under Option 2 in the within and between data for the Denver friends versus income scenario (13) and the Cornell 
money versus time, education versus social life, and interest versus career scenarios (6, 9, and 10). We report the full 
details of the between-subjects data analysis, including all the relevant distributions and statistical tests mentioned 
in this subsection, in BHKR (Section IIB, Table 2, and Table A4).
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C. Measurement Error
Our analysis above suggests that in many scenarios, individuals do not respond 
to the choice and SWB questions as if they were responding to the same question. 
However, in a given scenario, such rejection of the null hypothesis could be explained 
by differences in measurement error across the two questions—for example, because 
it is easier to introspect about choice than about SWB, or vice versa. An individual 
whose “true” ranking of the options is identical across the questions is more likely to 
mistakenly rank the “wrong” option higher in a question with greater measurement 
error, leading to ranking proportions closer to 50–50 for that question.
Looking across Table 2’s columns reveals that cross-question differences in the 
measurement error for choice and SWB in the same direction in all scenarios in a 
study cannot explain our data. For example, in the Denver data, choice proportions 
are closer to 50–50 in Scenarios 1, 11, and 13, but SWB proportions are closer to 
50–50 in Scenarios 4 and 12.
To summarize, the two main findings in this section are (a) that most respondents 
in most scenarios do not exhibit choice- versus SWB-ranking reversals, and (b) that 
when they do, their pattern of reversals is systematic. Overall, the two findings hold 
up well—although with differences in relative strength—across scenarios, popula-
tions, and designs. Furthermore, these findings cannot be explained by a measure-
ment error structure that is stable across scenarios.
III. Do Other Factors Help Predict Choice, and by How Much?
In this section we ask: Can we identify other factors that help explain hypotheti-
cal choices, controlling for predicted own SWB? We also analyze to what extent
respondents’ choices in our data can be explained by their predicted SWB and other 
aspects of life together, compared with their predicted SWB alone.
We address these questions using data from the Cornell sample, where we ask 
respondents to rank the options on a set of 11 additional aspects of life, in addition 
to ranking them on choice and own SWB (see Section IC). Specifically, in addition 
to being asked about “your own happiness,” respondents are also asked about: your 
family’s happiness, your health, your romantic life, your social life, your control 
over your life, your life’s level of spirituality, your life’s level of fun, your social 
status, your life’s nonboringness, your physical comfort, and your sense of purpose. 
While still a limited list, it is intended to capture “functionings” proposed by econo-
mists and philosophers (Sen 1985; Nussbaum 2000); nonhedonic and eudaimonic 
components of well-being proposed by psychologists (e.g., White and Dolan 2009)
that are not fully captured by measures of SWB (Ryff 1989); as well as other factors 
that we thought might matter for choice besides own happiness.
The design of our Cornell between-subjects surveys allows us to also elicit within-
subject data from our 201 participants. This is done by presenting subjects with 
the between-subjects part of the survey, followed by an additional, within-subject 
part.21 When discussing the between-subjects results in Section IIB we used only 
21To be specific, we present the entire sequence of ten scenarios three times. First, each scenario is presented and 
is followed by only a choice question (for half the respondents) or only a SWB question (for the other half). Second, 
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data from the first, between-subjects part. In contrast, in this section we pool data 
from both parts, treating them as within-subject data. Further pooling these data 
with the original Cornell within-subject data (432 respondents) yields an augmented 
sample of 633 Cornell within-subject respondents, which we analyze here. As we 
report in Section IV, our main results hold in the constituent subsamples.
A. Response Distributions
Figure 1 displays, by scenario, the histograms of raw, multipoint responses to 
the choice, (own) SWB, and 11 other aspect questions. Note first that the choice 
responses—and also the SWB responses, although to a lesser extent—tend to be 
bimodal with most of the mass on “definitely” or “probably,” suggesting that the 
choice-SWB reversals discussed in Section II are not the result of widespread 
near-indifferences. Second, notice that we were rather successful in constructing 
Scenario 5 (apple versus orange): almost everyone indicates “no difference” in the 
bottom 11 cells in this column. While 37 percent also indicate “no difference” on 
SWB, the low count of reversals in Scenario 5 suggests that for the other respon-
dents, variation in choice is strongly related to variation in SWB. Finally, note that in 
many other scenarios, there is substantial variation in the 11 other aspect rankings, 
and that the histogram of choice responses sometimes looks rather different from the 
histogram of SWB responses.
B. Explaining the Variation in Choice
Table 3 presents a variety of specifications in which we regress choice on SWB and 
other aspects of life, aggregating data across the ten scenarios (we discuss regres-
sions by scenario in Section VB below). We want to estimate the relationship from 
the within-scenario—rather than the between-scenario—variation in responses. For 
this purpose, in the probit and ordered probit specifications, we include scenario 
fixed effects. In the OLS specifications, we demean all variables at the scenario level. 
Doing so yields coefficients identical to those in a fixed-effects OLS specification, 
but has the advantage that the R2s reflect only the within-scenario explanatory power 
of the regressors.
The first column of Table 3 reports an OLS regression of six-point choice on 
seven-point SWB. The R2 shows that 0.38 of the variation in choice is explained by 
own happiness alone. In comparison, a regression of the same choice measure on 
our 11 other aspects (each as a seven-point variable) yields an R2 of 0.21 (second
column of Table 3). Hence, we find that own SWB predicts choice substantially bet-
ter than all of the other aspects combined. In the third column we regress choice on 
both own SWB and the 11 other aspects. The R2 of 0.41 is substantially higher than 
after respondents finish answering that question for each of the ten scenarios, the ten scenarios are presented again, 
each followed by only the question (SWB or choice) respondents had not seen yet. Finally, the ten scenarios are 
presented for a third time, with each scenario followed by the 11 additional questions about other aspects of life. 
Respondents are specifically instructed to answer the surveys in exactly the order questions are presented, and the 
experimenters verify that they do (in the rare cases where a respondent was observed to flip through the pages, she/
he was promptly reminded of this instruction). With this design, excluding data collected after the first round of 
scenario-presentation yields between-subjects data.
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that in the second column but is only slightly higher than that in the first column.22
The pattern in these three columns is similar when we relax the linear functional 
form, replacing each regressor with a set of six dummy variables (not reported).
In summary, when we pool data across scenarios we find that adding 11 additional 
aspects to the regression of choice on own SWB increases explanatory power, but 
the increase is rather modest. (The increase is substantial, however, in some of the 
individual scenarios, as we report in Section VB.)
C. Comparing the Coefficients
In order to compare and interpret the coefficients in Table 3, we assume that 
hypothetical choices in our data can be represented as maximizing a utility function
U(H(X), X), where H is own SWB and X is a vector of other factors that might 
affect choice both directly and indirectly through H.23 If people choose what they 
think would maximize their SWB alone (as opposed to trading off their SWB for 
22Bootstrapped standard errors yield the following 95 percent confidence intervals around the three respective 
R2s: [0.36, 0.40], [0.19, 0.23], and [0.39, 0.43].
23For a more thorough treatment of our empirical framework within this simple model, see BHKR.
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Figure 1. Raw Response Distributions (Choice and Aspects of Life)
Notes: Based on 633 Cornell respondents. The histograms show the distribution of six-point responses to the choice 
question (top row) and seven-point responses to the aspect questions (bottom 12 rows). The left-most column 
aggregates data across choice scenarios; each of the other columns corresponds to a specific scenario.
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other factors), then the (vector) partial derivative ∂U/∂X will be identically zero. To a 
first-order approximation, this would require that all 11 coefficients other than that on 
own happiness in Table 3’s third column be zero—a hypothesis we can easily reject
(F-test p < 0.0001). This result is robust to treating the choice measure as ordinal or as 
binary (Table 3’s fifth and sixth columns); to relaxing the linearity of our SWB measure 
by replacing it with a set of six dummy variables; and to combinations of these speci-
fications. Furthermore, with the exception of Scenario 8 (where F-test p = 0.086), the 
result holds in each individual scenario.24 All this suggests that not all the marginal 
utilities ∂U/∂X are zero, even if the first-order approximation is imperfect.
24See Tables A7–A10 in BHKR for these and other specifications. Table A10 shows that this result holds by 
scenario even when the regressions include only aspects for which more than a trivial fraction of respondents (e.g.,
Table 3—Regressions of Choice on Aspects of Life
OLS Ordered Probit Probit
Measurement error 
correction None None None
SIMEX
corrected
additive None None
SIMEX
corrected
additive
Own happiness 0.54*** 0.46*** 0.59*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.48***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019)
Family happiness 0.15*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.13***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.026) (0.012) (0.017) (0.032)
Health 0.07*** 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.021) (0.019) (0.031) (0.016) (0.022) (0.042)
Life’s level of romance −0.00 −0.01 0.01 −0.00 −0.00 0.04
(0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.018) (0.025) (0.045)
Social life −0.01 −0.03* −0.05* −0.02 −0.02 −0.04
(0.020) (0.018) (0.028) (0.015) (0.021) (0.036)
Control over your life 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.13***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.025) (0.012) (0.017) (0.028)
Life’s level of spirituality −0.08*** −0.02 −0.04 −0.02 −0.04 −0.05
(0.024) (0.021) (0.036) (0.018) (0.025) (0.047)
Life’s level of fun 0.13*** 0.05** 0.03 0.04** 0.04** 0.03
(0.021) (0.018) (0.031) (0.015) (0.021) (0.036)
Social status 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.10***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.023) (0.012) (0.016) (0.027)
Life’s nonboringness 0.07*** −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.020) (0.017) (0.030) (0.014) (0.020) (0.037)
Physical comfort 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.03 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04
(0.017) (0.014) (0.023) (0.012) (0.017) (0.030)
Sense of purpose 0.21*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.14***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.011) (0.015) (0.025)
Observations 6,217 6,217 6,217 6,217 6,217 6,217 6,217
(pseudo) R2 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.35
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. In the OLS and ordered probit regressions, the dependent variable is six-point 
choice. In the probit regressions the dependent variable is binary choice. All regressions use seven-point ratings of 
aspects. Based on 633 Cornell respondents. Each observation is a respondent’s choice and aspect ratings for one sce-
nario; there are ten observations per respondent corresponding to the ten scenarios in the questionnaires. Probit and 
ordered probit regressions include (unreported) scenario fixed effects. OLS regressions’ variables are demeaned at the 
scenario level, generating coefficients equivalent to those generated by including scenario fixed effects. Measurement 
error corrections are done using the Simulation-Extrapolation method described in Section III, under the assump-
tion of additive measurement error. Observations with missing data in any variable are excluded from all regressions.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Moving from testing the null hypothesis to interpreting the magnitudes of coeffi-
cients requires additional assumptions—both standard econometric assumptions and 
psychological ones. Econometrically, for example, if X includes aspects we did not 
measure, the coefficients might be biased due to omitted variables. Psychologically, 
the coefficients are comparable only if respondents respond to the seven-point scales 
similarly across the 12 aspects.
Comparing the coefficients in the third column of Table 3, the coefficient on own 
happiness is by far the largest. A one-point increase in our seven-point measure of 
predicted SWB is associated with a highly significant 0.46-point increase in our six-
point choice measure. After own happiness, the largest coefficients are on sense of 
purpose (0.12), control over one’s life (0.08), family happiness (0.08), and social 
status (0.06). The relative sizes of the coefficients are similar in alternative speci-
fications (e.g., the ordered probit column), but remember that the data are pooled 
across surveys that use two opposite orders in which aspects are presented, and 
order matters for the coefficient estimates (see Section IV). While the rejection of 
∂U/∂X = 0 suggests that own SWB is not the only argument in the “hypothetical-
choice utility function,” a comparison of the coefficients suggests that the marginal 
utility of own happiness is several times larger than the marginal utilities of even the 
most significant among the other aspects we measure.25
D. Measurement Error
Measurement error in our measures of own happiness and the other aspects will bias 
the coefficient estimates and potentially also invalidate our test of the null hypothesis 
∂U/∂X = 0. In order to address these concerns, we collected repeated observations 
on a subsample (of 230) of our Cornell respondents. This enables us to estimate mea-
surement-error-corrected regressions. In particular, we use Simulation-Extrapolation 
(SIMEX) (Cook and Stefanski 1994), a semi-parametric method that assumes homo-
skedastic, additive measurement error but does not make assumptions about the distri-
bution of the regressors.26 As shown in Table 3, relative to the OLS results, the SIMEX 
coefficient on own happiness increases and remains by far the most predictive regres-
sor. However, the other aspects with largest coefficients and statistical significance in 
the OLS regressions remain statistically significant and also increase, suggesting that 
our main results in this section are not due to measurement error.
15 percent) indicate answers other than “no difference.” In other words, it holds even when we include only the most 
reliably estimated coefficients. Interestingly, Table A10 shows that the only large and robust non-SWB coefficient 
in the “apple versus orange” scenario is that on “physical comfort”; this seems consistent with the de gustibus 
interpretation of this scenario.
25However, we believe that the most plausible bias from unmeasured factors exaggerates the coefficient on own 
happiness. In particular, an unmeasured factor whose effect on H has the same sign as its direct effect (i.e., not 
through H) on U will bias upward the coefficient on own happiness.
26Intuitively, the SIMEX method proceeds in two steps. First, it simulates datasets with additional measurement 
error and uses them to estimate the function describing how the regression coefficients change with the amount of 
measurement error. Then the algorithm extrapolates in order to estimate what the coefficients would be if there were no 
measurement error in the original data. We choose this method over several more common measurement error correc-
tion methods (such as IV or regression disattenuation) for several reasons. Primarily, the other methods are much less 
efficient in this setting. Moreover, the SIMEX method is flexible in its treatment of the measurement error structure, it 
accommodates misclassified categorical data, and it easily accommodates nonlinear models such as probit or ordered 
probit regressions. For additional discussion of SIMEX see BHKR, and for IV results, see Table A12 there.
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IV. Robustness
To examine the robustness of our results from Sections II and III, we conduct 
a long list of additional analyses. Full details, including all tables and statistics, 
are reported in BHKR. In this section we briefly summarize our findings. Unless 
stated otherwise, they are based on our within-subject data from either the Denver 
or Cornell samples.
Are Results Driven by Only a Few Individuals?—We find that most respondents 
(both in Denver and Cornell) exhibit at least one reversal and that very few exhibit 
reversals in half or more of the scenarios. Moreover, to explore whether some of 
the respondents who do not exhibit a choice-SWB reversal in a given scenario 
would have done so if that scenario’s trade-off between SWB and other factors had 
assigned a different “price” to SWB, some Denver respondents face three versions of 
Scenario 4 (legacy versus income), with three different income levels in the income 
option (see details in the online Appendix). Ninety-one percent of these respondents 
monotonically rank the income option higher in both choice and SWB as the amount 
of income increases. Of those, 22 percent exhibit a choice-SWB reversal for at least 
one income level, compared to an average of 12 percent reversals at a given income 
level. This suggests that the fraction of reversals we observe in other scenarios is a 
lower bound on the fraction who would exhibit a reversal in those scenarios with 
some “price of SWB.”
Scenario-Order Effects and Participant Fatigue.—We investigate the effects of 
scenario order on responses with our Denver sample, where respondents face the six 
scenarios in one of two opposite orders (see Table 1). Scenario-order effects could 
arise, for example, due to increasing fatigue or boredom among respondents. While 
we indeed find evidence of scenario-order effects on response patterns, they do not 
systematically affect the degree of choice-SWB concordance we find.
Respondents’ Explanations for their Choice-SWB Reversals.—After our Cornell 
respondents finish responding to all the decision scenarios, we directly ask all of 
them additional questions, including: whether any choice-SWB reversals they might 
have made were a mistake (only 7 percent respond “Yes”); whether they think they 
would regret any choice-SWB reversal they might have made (23 percent respond 
“Yes”); and whether they were trying to make their choice and SWB responses 
consistent (20 percent respond that they were). Our results from Section III remain 
largely the same when the analysis excludes groups of respondents based on their 
responses to these questions. We also ask respondents to explain their reasoning for 
any choice-SWB reversals, and we view the resulting qualitative data as roughly 
consistent with our main results.27
27For example, many respondents mention trade-offs between their own happiness and the happiness of family 
and friends, or mention trade-offs between short-lived happiness and goals such as long-term career success. The 
full text of these responses is included with the rest of the data, and is available online.
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Self-Control.—To assess whether choice-SWB reversals merely reflect a self-
control problem (as in Laibson 1997), in addition to asking participants what they 
would choose, we also ask some of them what they would want themselves to choose 
(the meta-choice question mentioned in Section IC). Aggregating across all surveys 
that include the meta-choice question (see Table 1), we find reversals between choice 
and meta-choice in 28 percent of the cases. While self-control problems may be rele-
vant in these cases, our main conclusions from Section III are robust to either excluding 
these observations or to replacing choice with meta-choice as the dependent variable.
Context of Choice, SWB, and Other-Aspect Questions.—Respondents’ interpreta-
tions of the questions or their understanding of the meaning of the related concepts 
may be context dependent.28 As mentioned in Sections I (see Table 1) and III, differ-
ent versions of our surveys vary in whether the choice and SWB questions are asked 
close together or far apart, and in the order the questions are asked; they also vary 
in the distance between own happiness and the other 11 aspects, and in the order 
of the aspects. Repeating our analysis in Section III by questionnaire organization 
indicates that order and context effects do indeed matter. For example, aspects listed 
earlier have larger coefficients, and own happiness as part of a 12-aspect list has a 
smaller coefficient than as a stand-alone question. Yet, in all designs, aspects other 
than own happiness are statistically significant, and the coefficient on own happiness 
has the highest point estimate among the aspects.
V. Heterogeneity in Choice-SWB Concordance
We have thus far focused on characterizing the average concordance between our 
choice and SWB measures. However, the averages mask substantial heterogene-
ity: across our questionnaires (see Table 1) and scenarios, choice-SWB coincidence 
ranges from well below 50 percent to above 95 percent. To provide information that 
may be useful for researchers and policymakers, we conduct our main analysis sepa-
rately across SWB measures, scenarios, and respondent characteristics. This section 
briefly summarizes a more thorough treatment in BHKR.
A. Comparing SWB Measures
We compare how well our different SWB question variants predict choice by com-
paring R2s from univariate OLS regressions of our multiple-point choice variable on 
each of our multiple-point SWB measures. As in Section III, we demean our vari-
ables at the scenario level. In the Denver sample, the life satisfaction question vari-
ant (i) is the best predictor of the choice question, with R 2 = 0.65. Happiness with 
life as a whole (ii) and felt happiness (iii) come second and third, respectively, with 
R 2 = 0.59 and 0.55. The felt happiness R 2 is statistically significantly lower than 
the life satisfaction R 2 (p = 0.02 calculated using bootstrapped standard errors),
and the R 2 for happiness with life as a whole is not statistically distinguishable
28Notice the important difference between this possibility and the possibility of cross-respondent differences in 
the interpretations or understanding of the scenarios. The latter possibility is a lesser concern as long as a respon-
dent’s interpretation or understanding of a scenario remains the same across the choice and SWB questions.
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from the other two. In the Cornell sample, own happiness with life as a whole (iv)
and immediately felt own happiness (v) have R 2 = 0.39 and 0.37, not statistically 
distinguishable from each other.
These R2s and our findings in Section IIA paint a consistent picture. While in the 
Denver data the life-satisfaction-type SWB question is more predictive of choice 
than the happiness-type SWB questions, in both Denver and Cornell the felt happi-
ness and the happiness with life as a whole questions predict choice similarly. On 
the evaluative-versus-affective spectrum of SWB measures (see Section IC), these 
results lend partial support to the notion that more evaluative measures may generate 
rankings more similar to hypothetical choice.29
B. Comparing Scenarios
For applied work, it is useful to know in which situations the assumption that 
people’s choices maximize their predicted SWB is a better or worse approxima-
tion. Table 4 shows the benchmark OLS specification from Table 3, conducted sepa-
rately for each of the ten scenarios in the Cornell data. The “Incremental R 2” row 
reports the difference between the R2s from the reported multivariate regressions 
and R2s from univariate regressions of choice on only own happiness (which are 
not reported).
As discussed above, Scenario 5 (apple versus orange)—which was designed 
to minimize choice-SWB reversals—has little variance in aspects other than own 
SWB and the fewest reversals (see Figure 1 and Table 2). As expected, the R 2 in a 
univariate regression of choice on SWB is the highest (at 0.56) in Scenario 5, and 
the incremental R 2 from adding all other aspects is the lowest (at 0.02). If this type 
of minor decision—which possibly comprises most decisions in life—generally 
features low variance in aspects other than own SWB, then the assumption that 
people’s choices maximize their predicted SWB might be a good approximation 
in such settings.
Interestingly, at the other extreme, the four scenarios we designed to be represen-
tative of typical important decisions (see Section IB) facing our college-age Cornell 
sample—Scenarios 7–10 (socialize versus sleep, family versus money, education 
versus social life, and interest versus career)—are among the scenarios with the 
lowest univariate R 2 and, correspondingly, the highest incremental R 2. Indeed, in 
Scenarios 7 and 10, where univariate R 2 is the lowest—at 0.25 and 0.24, respec-
tively—incremental R 2 is 0.07 and 0.13. Here, the additional 11 aspects increase 
predictive power (as measured by R 2) substantially, by 28 and 54 percent. This, 
in turn, suggests that one should be especially cautious in assuming that people’s 
choices maximize their predicted SWB in empirical applications that focus on 
important life decisions.
29One possible hypothesis as to why some SWB measures are better predictors of choice is that they induce 
participants to more accurately report the present value of instantaneous SWB flows over time. Our data do not 
allow us to directly test this hypothesis because we have no direct evidence on how respondents aggregate SWB 
over time. However, our finding that variant (v)—about happiness “in the few minutes immediately after making 
the choice”—is as predictive of choice as variant (iv)—about happiness in “life as a whole”—seems inconsistent 
with this view.
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The rest of the scenarios lie somewhere in between. They include the scenarios 
that were designed to explore common themes from the happiness literature and, 
surprisingly, those designed as situations where we most expected to find tensions 
between SWB and other factors.
C. Comparing Respondents
Across the Denver, CNSS, and Cornell samples, we find relatively little evidence 
for differences in the frequency of choice-SWB reversals across demographics that 
include gender, age, race, education, and income, with the exception that in the 
Cornell sample, black respondents are more likely than others to exhibit reversals. 
In the Cornell within-subject sample, we measured the “Big 5” personality traits 
using John and Srivastava’s (1999) BFI scale. We find that a one–standard deviation 
increase in conscientiousness is associated with a 2 percent lower likelihood of a 
reversal, while a one–standard deviation increase in neuroticism (i.e., moody, tense)
is associated with a 2 percent higher likelihood of a reversal.
Table 4—OLS Regressions of Choice on All Aspects of Life, by Scenario
Choice scenario 1 2 3 4 5
All Sleep Concert Abs. inc. Legacy Apple
scenarios versus versus versus versus versus
pooled income birthday rel. inc. income orange
Own happiness 0.46*** 0.38*** 0.44*** 0.52*** 0.44*** 0.73***
(0.010) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.036)
Family happiness 0.08*** 0.07** 0.01 0.16*** 0.05 0.16
(0.015) (0.032) (0.071) (0.046) (0.041) (0.159)
Health 0.00 −0.05 −0.07 −0.11 −0.04 0.05
(0.019) (0.055) (0.076) (0.077) (0.058) (0.065)
Life’s level of romance −0.01 0.08 −0.02 0.07 −0.00 −0.67***
(0.021) (0.059) (0.064) (0.078) (0.066) (0.228)
Social life −0.03* −0.02 0.02 −0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.018) (0.055) (0.043) (0.056) (0.058) (0.225)
Control over your life 0.08*** 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.08** −0.00
(0.015) (0.042) (0.053) (0.056) (0.039) (0.093)
Life’s level of spirituality −0.02 −0.04 −0.00 −0.16* 0.13** 0.31
(0.021) (0.049) (0.061) (0.090) (0.055) (0.221)
Life’s level of fun 0.05** 0.06 0.15*** 0.04 0.05 −0.08
(0.018) (0.042) (0.051) (0.066) (0.047) (0.127)
Social status 0.06*** −0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 −0.27
(0.014) (0.036) (0.045) (0.040) (0.036) (0.227)
Life’s nonboringness −0.01 0.05 −0.03 0.22*** −0.01 0.09
(0.017) (0.037) (0.054) (0.078) (0.047) (0.121)
Physical comfort 0.04*** 0.09** 0.00 −0.05 0.00 0.21***
(0.014) (0.036) (0.060) (0.054) (0.042) (0.066)
Sense of purpose 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.29**
(0.013) (0.038) (0.047) (0.044) (0.041) (0.119)
Observations 6,217 615 621 620 624 624
R2 0.41 0.46 0.43 0.53 0.41 0.58
Incremental R2 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02
(Continued)
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VI. Discussion
Throughout this paper, we have remained agnostic as to which survey question, 
if any, best elicits a person’s preferences.30 However, if one assumes that hypotheti-
cal choices reveal preferences, our results could help in reconciling two opposing 
theoretical views regarding the relationship between SWB data and preferences. 
30Note that while economists often assume that incentivized choice reveals preferences, which in turn defines eco-
nomic welfare, psychologists instead often equate experienced SWB with welfare (see, e.g., Kahneman, Wakker, and 
Sarin 1997). Taking this latter perspective, Hsee (1999) and Hsee et al. (2003) interpret reversals between hypotheti-
cal choice and predicted SWB as evidence of mistakes in choice behavior. For careful discussions of the appropriate 
notion of welfare, see, e.g., Tversky and Griffin (2000); Loewenstein and Ubel (2008); and Fleurbaey (2009).
Table 4—OLS Regressions of Choice on All Aspects of Life, by Scenario (Continued)
Choice scenario 6 7 8 9 10
Money Socialize Family Education Interest
versus versus versus versus versus
time sleep money social life career
Own happiness 0.53*** 0.31*** 0.53*** 0.35*** 0.27***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030)
Family happiness 0.15** −0.09* 0.05 0.14*** 0.21***
(0.059) (0.053) (0.050) (0.037) (0.041)
Health 0.06 0.18*** 0.05 −0.03 −0.06
(0.075) (0.054) (0.057) (0.044) (0.063)
Life’s level of romance −0.10 0.02 −0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.086) (0.054) (0.068) (0.053) (0.072)
Social life 0.04 −0.00 −0.05 −0.04 0.01
(0.071) (0.065) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Control over your life 0.07 0.15*** 0.05 0.06 0.07**
(0.052) (0.043) (0.049) (0.038) (0.035)
Life’s level of spirituality −0.15 −0.01 −0.15** −0.00 −0.01
(0.091) (0.076) (0.062) (0.054) (0.068)
Life’s level of fun 0.13* −0.03 0.03 0.06 −0.00
(0.068) (0.073) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057)
Social status −0.01 0.06 0.11* 0.06* 0.16***
(0.061) (0.059) (0.060) (0.029) (0.043)
Life’s nonboringness −0.03 0.18*** −0.05 −0.02 0.05
(0.060) (0.062) (0.061) (0.055) (0.055)
Physical comfort −0.00 0.05 −0.10** 0.06 −0.02
(0.049) (0.048) (0.041) (0.040) (0.049)
Sense of purpose 0.05 0.04 0.09** 0.17*** 0.17***
(0.050) (0.044) (0.046) (0.037) (0.029)
Observations 619 622 625 626 621
R2 0.42 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.37
Incremental R2 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.13
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions of six-point choice on seven-point aspects of life. Based on 633 
Cornell respondents. The left-most column aggregates data across choice scenarios; each of the other columns corre-
sponds to a specific scenario. Each observation is a respondent’s choice and aspect ratings for one scenario; there are 
ten observations per respondent corresponding to the ten scenarios in the questionnaires. All variables are demeaned 
at the scenario level. “Incremental R2” is the difference in R2 between the reported multivariate regression and a uni-
variate regression of choice on own happiness; it represents the increased percentage of variation in choice that can 
be explained by including the additional aspects. Observations with missing data in any variable are excluded from 
the regression. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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The first, reflected at least implicitly in much of the economics of happiness litera-
ture, is that SWB data represent idealized revealed-preference utility in the sense 
of what individuals would choose if their predictions of the SWB consequences of 
their choices were not biased. The second view, explicitly laid out in, e.g., Kimball 
and Willis (2006) and Becker and Rayo (2008), is that even well-informed agents 
will be willing to trade off SWB for other things they care about, making SWB and 
preferences distinct. Our results suggest that people do not seek to maximize SWB 
exclusively, at least as it is currently measured, but that SWB is a uniquely important 
argument of the utility function.
Since hypothetical choices maximize predicted SWB (especially “life satisfac-
tion”) for most of our respondents in most of our scenarios, our results might be 
interpreted as comforting for applied researchers who use SWB as a proxy for util-
ity. We caution that the amount of choice-SWB concordance we find overstates the 
justification to treat SWB as a proxy for utility; applications always require addi-
tional assumptions that we do not test. For example, typical assumptions are that 
SWB measures are comparable and can be aggregated across individuals.31
When comparing scenarios, our results suggest that, first, researchers should be 
especially cautious when interpreting SWB data as indicating what well-informed 
individuals would choose in settings that are perceived by those individuals to 
involve personally important decisions. Second, in settings where one alternative 
involves higher income or more money, our survey respondents are systematically 
more likely to choose the money alternative than they are likely to predict it will 
yield higher SWB. Unless this systematic gap is sufficiently negatively correlated 
with the difference between the predicted-experienced SWB gap and the hypo-
thetical-incentivized choice gap, this finding in turn suggests that the increasingly 
common practice of estimating implicit willingness to pay for nonmarket goods by 
comparing the coefficient on income with that on another variable in multivariate 
SWB regressions may bias these estimates upwards relative to incentivized choice–
based estimates.
Our scenario-based methodology could be usefully applied in several new direc-
tions. First, the method of assessing choice-SWB correspondence could be used to 
assess new SWB measures that might predict hypothetical choice better than exist-
ing SWB measures. Our findings suggest that responses to existing measures do 
not fully capture the weight that factors such as sense of purpose have in explaining 
choice. Additionally, existing SWB measures may primarily reflect current feelings, 
rather than also reflecting anticipated future SWB flows. In BHKR we describe pilot 
data we collected on two novel measures aimed at addressing these issues, neither 
of which appears to predict choice any better than existing measures. Nonetheless, 
developing new measures seems an especially promising area for further research.32
31Our results may also overstate the extent to which standard SWB questions provide a good measure of prefer-
ences because standard questions are asked absolutely (“How satisfied are you with your life?”), while our SWB 
questions are asked relatively (“Between these two options, which do you think would make you more satisfied with 
life?”). Different individuals may apply different scales to a greater extent for an absolute measure, making it more 
difficult to translate an absolute SWB measure into a meaningful utility number than might be suggested by our results.
32Since different SWB questions seem to capture distinct dimensions of well being that correlate differently 
with income and other variables (e.g., Kahneman and Deaton 2010), future research could also explore whether a 
combination of SWB questions predicts choice better than any individual SWB question alone (including ladder- or 
mountain-type SWB questions, which we do not study in this paper).
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Second, our method could be used to provide more tailored guidance for applied 
work by asking about scenarios that are intended to address specific issues of interest. 
To illustrate this point, we pilot four such scenarios at the end of our Cornell repeat-
survey. For example, to reconcile the intuition that Americans today are better off 
than in the past with the finding that average SWB has remained flat in the United 
States over the past decades (Easterlin 1974, 1995; see Stevenson and Wolfers 2008 
for a recent assessment), we ask respondents to rank being born in 1950 versus being 
born in 1990 in both choice and SWB questions. Although our respondents over-
whelmingly favor being born in 1990 in both questions, more choose 1990 despite 
believing that they would be happier in 1950 than the reverse. This result indeed 
suggests that some people prefer being born later even if it does not make them 
happier. For another example, to reconcile the intuition that expanding political and 
economic freedoms for women have made women better off with the finding that 
average SWB among women has declined in the United States since the 1970s, both 
absolutely and relative to men (Stevenson and Wolfers 2009), we ask respondents to 
rank living in a world with or without these expanded freedoms for women. Again, 
significantly more respondents choose a world with these expanded freedoms for 
women in spite of believing that a world without them would make them happier 
than the reverse. For further examples and full details, see BHKR.
Finally, some researchers have attempted to identify the key non-SWB aspects 
of life that are associated with greater welfare (e.g., Sen 1985). Others have called 
for an SWB-based “national well-being index” to provide a measure of welfare that 
captures factors not represented in economic indicators such as GDP (e.g., Diener et 
al. 2009). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to empirically 
estimate weights on SWB and other factors in a way that might be useful for com-
bining them into an overall index for predicting what individuals themselves would 
choose. If hypothetical choices are assumed to reveal preferences that are relevant 
for evaluating welfare, then our method could be applied more systematically for the 
purpose of developing a well-being index.
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